

1. No & Date of tape: AV/942 Date: 29/4/94
2. Identity of tape: Radio Rwanda transmission.
3. Name of translator: Lydie MPAMBARA.
4. Date of translation: 18/10/96
5. Important Passage Location: A 27.8 and continuation on B O.5

SIDE A: A 27.8

Interview of Ngeze Hassan by Etienne Karekezi

E.K: Mister Ngeze Hassan, Chief editor of the newspaper Kangura, welcome to Radio Rwanda. Since the beginning of the war, many people have been saying that you wrote things . . . the things you wrote . . . we waited for some to happen and we saw them happening. I can say that many of them happened. Now, first tell us your opinion about this war, since its beginning until the current times.

N.H.: Thank you Mr. Etienne for handing over to me. Actually, as you asked me, we often wrote about this war. As many Rwandans who followed Kangura's articles, in our newspaper since its publication . . . I think this is its 4th year of existence . . . We wrote mostly about this war which Inyenzi Inkotanyi imposed to us. We can say that in the newspapers published in Rwanda, we were the ones who had got more military information than the others. You know that some newspapers wrote mostly about Inkotanyi's things. They wrote things of the Inkotanyi's side. We are the only ones who could say that we especially wrote on real things, I mean, on things talking about those who support the sovereignty of the Republic, about those Rwandans who did not accept that the enemy should take their country. That does not mean that those who wrote from the enemy's information did not know the truth. It is possible that they knew the truth, aware that what they said came from the enemy, but that there is a reality of which they were aware. You know that even some officials also did not take notice of the truth they knew and sided with the enemy. I will especially talk about our opinion on this war, how we considered it in the past days and how we think it will be in the future. When starting, you asked me that we said many things about this war, and most of them happened. On that question, Kangura's journalists did not use any special intelligence. Rather, a genuine journalist, a journalist who respects himself and respects his profession . . . Before taking your pen and starting to write, you first approach experienced people and they tell you about the past. You know that this war of Inyenzi is not only of 90. It started in 59, 60. When you can approach people - and they exist, who are old - who have been through all these times, who saw how was the Inyenzi war was conducted, how they attacked and the signs of that. After having got the pieces of advice of those old men, you try to approach the leaders of this country, those you consider to be honest and they also give you their opinion about those things and then, you analyze without partiality and you try to foresee how things will be in the future. At time you (inaudible.) In such a way that . . . It is not prophesy. Like now, we can sit together here and I can tell you: "In two months time . . ."

End of Side A.

SIDE B: B 0.5

N.H.: ...honest who do their job as they were told, they tell you their opinion and the obstacles. You too, in a journalistic analysis, without any fail, you see the future situation.

E.K: Without interrupting you, you wrote some things which actually happened. So, some people are wondering: "Was that man informed of those things? Was he among the planners?" What will you say about that?

N.H.: There, you see that people, I can say that many Rwandans were not yet well used to press. You know that before the birth of local press, in JEUNE AFRIQUE, there was somebody named Béchir Ben Yahmed. When a president took office, he would say the situation of that president in five years for example. You know that that happened. You know that he is the one who first said that Thomas Sankara would die. That he will take office but not for more than three years. He also has got those information of which I was telling you. For the question of Kangura to be more understandable, let us start by the time before the war. You know that in 83, we were writing in Kanguka, ... You know that the way people were then thinking is not the same way as they think today. We saw how people then thought. When we then wrote, it was before the war. Around the beginning of the war, those whom I should call the "enemy," "Inyenzi Inkotanyi" ... those Rwigara, Kajeguhakwa ... saw that in Rwanda, the independent newspaper ... We are the ones who founded the independent newspapers, I Ngeze Hassan and Rwabukwisi Vincent. Like Kinyamateka, it is a priests' newspapers, like Imvaho, it is for the government, Dialogue ... It is we and a newspaper named "Rafiki." We are the ones who first took up the pen in 86, you see that we have been in the private press for almost 8 years. You understand that we have got some experience in the profession. We know its good sides and all its difficulties. That is when the enemy tried to use that private newspaper Kanguka to brainwash the people, to transmit what he wishes through that newspaper. Then, after knowing them well, I felt that I could not betray the country, that I could not help those with whom I was working to betray the country, helping them transmitting their ideas. That is when a newspaper named "Kangura" was born. So, Kanguka and Kangura broke up. Understanding that was difficult for people, because we came out ... You know that in our first number, we were saying that Rwanda will be soon attacked. One would say: "Where had we got that from?" Is not that the sense of your question? For us, we considered the preparations Tutsis were busy making, we considered how the leaders here were sleeping. Some leaders here were sleeping. Of what? They were put to sleep by money ... Like Rwigara, he could take one leader -excuse me, I will not mention names - and say: "In order to blind so-and-so- leader, for him not to see what we will do, let us associate him in a society we want to found." They would tell him: "Listen, you will never get anywhere with your salary. We want to found a society. Let us lend you some 20 millions, and they will be your shares in so-and-so society." So, you see that they would have blinded that leader in such a way that he will only take in consideration the interests of his "stomach," not the interests of the country. You understand how was the situation. That situation, we ... I met Kajeguhakwa on several occasions at his place in Kicukiro and I listened to his ideas. We also met other Hutus, those of whom Bikindi said that they are Hutus of "big stomachs." We saw what their ideas were. We considered the

preparations that were being made, particularly inside the country, we considered how Tutsis here in Rwanda were sending children to the Inyenzi outside. I considered how inside the country the authorities knew that, there is nothing we said that the authorities did not know. The authorities knew all those things that were being done inside the country. Still, because of that, because of that trap I told you which the enemy had set for them of showing them the interests of their stomachs only. So, they were not considering the interests of the country, what the Revolution of 59 was showing to them, what it was teaching them, what was its heritage. We felt that we could not fall into that trap of people who worked for their stomachs. Then, I tried to approach It is not only me Ngeze. . . I tried to approach people who share the same ideas as I do, various people who also think that they must fight for the sovereignty of their country. I told them about my opinion and they also told me theirs. Then we made those analysis and found that a war was about to happen in Rwanda. There, you got me well . . . That is then we wrote that in Rwanda a war was about to happen, launched by Inyenzi Inkotanyi. It was the first time . . .

E.K. : You knew them?

N.H. : Yes, we knew them. We have then known them. We have then known them well, how they will come, how they will attack and who will support them. So, how did problems raise? The problem is that the government of Rwanda did not want us to say that the Tutsis of the interior of the country will support those Inyenzi. For example, the government of Rwanda did not want us to mention the then important Tutsis. You know that Kangura came out talking about Rwigara, Kajeguhakwa . . . You know the then situation of those people in this country. That issue came out, talking about the war. Many Rwandans did not expect that. Even the soldiers of a lower rank were surprised to hear that a newspaper wrote that in Rwanda, a war was about to happen while they were not aware of that. You know that it is that time we published the 2nd and 3rd issues and were thrown in prison. Those things had not yet happened. So, the truth of Kangura had not yet happened. It was seen . . . We were then arrested and brought before courts. I got a 20-year sentence . . . After, the war started. When the President of the Republic came back from abroad and arrived in Rwanda, some journalists . . . A press conference was held, which was even attended by foreigner journalist and journalists asked . . . I remember one journalist who worked here with ORINFOR who asked to the President of the Republic: "There is one journalist, . . . There are journalists who were imprisoned for having said that the war will happen and who have been sentenced. Is there no way you can amnesty those journalists and release them?" It is that press conference that made the President of the Republic to require from the then ministry of justice to amnesty me. You know that they gave me a special amnesty. I was given an individual amnesty and that is how I was released from the prison. You see that the first thing that Kangura has said had just happened. You understand there was no prophesy there. That does not mean that we worked with the enemy, it is just . . . I told you that a journalist who respects himself . . . analyzes all the sides to know what he will publish. Even now, if we could know the news of Murindi, to know all the places in which Inyenzi are, to know their news, if we should send people there to bring information for us, that is what we need. That is how a journalist from whom the mass expects what concerns his profession should behave. Then, after having been released, what did we do? That is the second stage. After having been released, we had got the

opportunity of announcing those accomplices that worked for the enemy. You know that there was something called "to point the finger at." We tried to show many authorities who worked with the enemy. You remember that. Until the time that even the established authorities believed that what Kangura was saying was the truth. You know that there are many leaders about whom we wrote . . . Of course, that does not mean that Kangura is the Bible. We can write ten things and among them, some are right. Maybe you can say seven or eight right things, using the process I told you about at the beginning of this interview. We talked a lot about accomplices. We talked of accomplices and gave the evidence for each of them. We talked about each stage of the war . . .

- (7) You know that most of the people we mentioned have been arrested. When checked, the government would find that what we have said is true. We made errors about some of them. There are some about whom we have been mistaken because . . . You know, in journalism, you can make errors. You may get few pieces of information or a small amount of time, and make an error on somebody, who may be arrested and imprisoned for nothing. We went on writing about accomplices, even among the leaders. You know that there are many leaders whom we mentioned and who were dismissed. It does not mean that it is we who had dismissed the leaders but the concerned institutions were also aware of that but thought that it was too much since the people got to know that. On seeing that the people knew it, those institutions felt that those leaders could not remain any longer in employment with such clear pieces of evidence, and with those they had in their offices. That does not mean that the power acted following Kangura's instructions. It is rather that Kangura has happened to know the professional behavior of those leaders. Then, the power that then was still strong considered that those people were not the ones who should represent the people, and they were dismissed. That is the second sign I can mention which happened. With the progression of the war, you know that multipartism was established. The political parties were born. With the birth of political parties, the other newspapers had not yet been established . . . Those other newspapers arrived much later after Kangura. When the political parties were born, we were fortunate enough to follow them closely because they were born before our very eyes. We saw how the party MDR was born and what the people expected from it. You know that we are the first who said that in MDR, Twagiramungu was an Inyenzi Inkotanyi. We were harassed a lot for that and we have even been imprisoned for that. We even produced evidence but as the Rwandan people say: "Ears in which death is do not hear." (Literal translation of a Rwandan proverb which means that a person in serious danger will never understand any warning.) What we told was understood later. What we said about MDR is understood now in these last times. I can say that it is another sign of what Kangura wrote. Etienne, you followed a lot the Kangura's articles. You know that it is we who said that Inyenzi were hidden within the party PL, that it is a party of Inyenzi. It was not yet even born. It was a week before that. We had happened to know that RPF planned to try to infiltrate the party that was about to spring up. Mugenzi and Mbonampeka had founded a party. When founding the party, they were not aware that Inyenzi will use it a lot. They did not know that because of the then situation. They still had the feeling that they were in the opposition, that it is the notion of liberalism they were bringing up in the opposition, the notion of freedom. Then, Tutsis adhered to that party in large number. You understand that . . . A political party is like a shop. If it needs members . . . So, Mugenzi and his mates wanted their party to get many members that would give them many votes during elections. That was their point of view. However, for us, we saw that in

their party, there were two trends: the trend they wished and the trend of Inyenzi Inkotanyi who wanted to get a breeding-ground from which it will get the youth to be sent to Inyenzi Inkotanyi. You know that we said that for a long time. We said it and we even shouted a lot until the time we showed the role RPF has got in that party PL. Then, we did not even share the same opinion with Mugenzi and his mates. Still, in the last days, you saw that what we had said about PL happened. You know that we had said that no matter what, Mugenzi and Mbonampeka will finally find out the truth and come to work with us on fighting for the sovereignty of the Republic. That happened. That is another sign of Kangura that was made clear. As we considered parties, as we foresaw their future situation, that is how it happened.

E.K: You said that you had been analyzing and knew how will the war start, how it will get worse. Did you analyze why the war lasted until now in Rwanda?

N.H.: We analyzed a lot that question so I can say that it is among those we have more mastered than the others. This war . . . You know that we started with a stage where we shared the same ideas. I will give you the example of when they said that Rwigama was dead. All the Rwandans, in all the parts of Rwanda, Hutus, Twas and Tutsis rose up together and expressed to the enemy that he probably cannot capture this Rwanda as long as they would still be united. Still, after that the leaders of the parties that gave to themselves the appellation "of opposition" joined the RPF's side . . . I am especially talking about those agreements signed between MDR, PL, PSD and RPF. It is them that brought us these problems we are still facing. After having noticed that they probably cannot capture us as long as we would still be united, and then, through Twagiramungu and his mates, the Inkotanyi used those Brussels agreements of total mutual collaboration. I told you . . . Excuse me, I will not mention names for the Rwandan people have known enough who betrayed them. I do not have to repeat it and say that so-and-so betrayed because it can happen that some people betrayed but afterwards came back to the right track. So, there is no way you can protest against somebody who betrayed but who came back to the right track. So, there is no need to mention names. We should rather consider what happened and the future situation. Then, RPF felt that it had got strength, they lent RPF much strength since political parties of opposition . . . you know that they name themselves "of opposition" . . . since important parties of opposition . . . you know that MDR is an important party . . . since important parties have agreed that they will work hand in hand in everything with the RPF. It was strength for the international community. So, the international community said: "we should support RPF since even the parties of the interior of the country agreed to work with it, it is because they think that RPF is fighting for something right." That caused us a lot of trouble. And I can say that the remaining leaders made a mistake. Because they did not rise up to tell the international community about the betrayal of those parties. The reason why those parties were going to collaborate with the enemy. You know that that was never done but we continued to shout it in the press. Then, you know that it is then that they captured Byumba and Ruhengeri. You know that we spent about one year and a half fighting at the border. Even if RPF used NRA's soldiers, because of the unity of the people in the country, the unity we used, the war was just taking place away at the border. It is that which led to those agreements named Arusha agreements. Those agreements said "of Arusha" were set up and started. Then, there was what was called the presidential trend, I can say that it is the leaders

close to the President of the Republic, they were the only ones who saw that the country was besieged. Even the people who belonged to those parties, the members of MDR, PSD and others . . . - I am talking of Hutus -, the majority of Hutus saw that. They saw that their country was besieged but there was no way they could express themselves because their top leaders whom they had elected themselves had betrayed them and signed with those Inyenzi. You remember them telling us that Inyenzi are our brothers, by force, without first asking us our opinion. You see, we are here in the studio of Radio Rwanda. You remember the Radio Rwanda's programme conducted all over the country, picking up ideas that were to be sent to Arusha. You know that the leaders of political parties did not allow the ideas given by the people to go anywhere. They remained here in your radio because at that moment nobody spoke for the people. Things went on. We saw how things were getting worse. I can say that we have got a data bank. We are keeping all the errors made that caused us all those problems, as you asked me. Things went on, and we started with the Arusha agreements. When we started with them, the enemy had got 5/10, his accomplice 4/10, you understand that it was 9. The enemy had already 9 in the negotiations. That means that the enemy asked himself and replied himself. He asked himself things and then, he gave them to himself. That was the situation in Arusha. But, you understand that there was still 1, it was not only the enemy who was there. If so, RPF alone should have gone to Arusha, written a paper and signed it. There was still 1 that represented us and from which we said that we did not agree with those things. You know that inside the country, they protested against the Arusha agreements on each occasion. We said: "You RPF, you came attacking the country." You know Bagdolite agreements. If in Bagdolite we had . . . What they say that RPF has got 40%, 60% . . . in Arusha . . . those Hutus of big stomachs who live here in the country gave it those things. Because for RPF, if they had sent the trend siding with the Republic, with the regime that was inside the country. I do not mean that the government was there. Because when you talk about power, it is not the whole power. Because you can find a minister who is an accomplice of Inkotanyi while his colleagues know where the problem lies. If we had negotiated with RPF, being the trend of Republic of Rwanda with RPF, I am telling you that even if RPF was given 5% should have not refused. Because even the international community know the RPF's strength and where the RPF's strength was from. We continued to protest against that. The President of the Republic explained it, its the difficulties. You remember in the meeting of Ruhengeri, the President of the Republic said: "If those agreements are not well studied, they can be like paper." What did he mean? You know, the Presidents are on the top, it is like someone who is on the top of a mountain, looking at the plain. The President of the Republic sees things that are invisible to us. Because he has got much data, there are things he sees which we do not see. The President of the Republic sat and saw that those agreements will bring us more misfortunes. He saw it and said it several times. The reason he said so is not any else but the one I told you that it is the enemy who went to Arusha along with people he had bought. He took them to Arusha to negotiate with him. We fought enough against those agreements, we held demonstrations against them, we used all possible means allowed by democracy because those agreements had been wrongly studied. A tangible example: you remember the man named Ngurinzira, that spokesman, being summoned by the President of the Republic: "Come and explain to me how those agreements are being prepared in Arusha." You remember the insolence used by Ngurinzira, saying: "If the President of the Republic needs those agreements, he should come and meet me in Arusha." Even an

illiterate peasant was hurt by that. Hearing that the Head of State, whom all us we know, who represented us, who represented us in all the international institutions, who looked for the arms we used for fighting. You know that it is he who declares and stops the war. It is he who did all those things for us. I think that it is after Ngurinzira said those things that everybody found out that there were serious tricks in those agreements. You know all of that, how it happened, the progress . . . So, the reason why . . . You asked me: "Why does the war last until now, while we were strong when starting?" The reason why the war lasted until now, it is because the enemy had enough time to get the strength that he should present to the international community. However, our Army continued to show courage. I can say that our Army did not work with that government because they continued to defend their country. Because normally, the soldier's job is to fight, to defend the country. If he does not do so, he is not longer a soldier, he should then withdraw and be like us, a civilian. A soldier must defend his country, no matter the situation. That is how the war progressed because of our leaders who continued to work with the one who was attacking us.

E.K: There are also things that you wrote, let me repeat it . . . Like in one Kangura I saw, I do not remember which issue it is, but you wrote: "Habyarimana will die in March, this year." So, people are wondering: "Did that guy prophesy those things? From where did he get it?" I would like you to explain to us the reason why you write so as we are together in the studio.

N.H.: OK, that question is something . . . Many Rwandans and I saw even foreigners, like a white man named Phillip Reyjens who recently called us asking us to analyze some things because he has heard that the analysis we make happen. You know that it is not the first time we said something which later happened. So, it is not the first thing. Generally, among all things we wrote, most of them happened. We considered the tricks . . . Yes, we have got a talent, in Kangura, we have got a talent. You know, there is a newspaper that is about events that already happened, and a newspaper that is about current events and a newspaper that especially talks about things that will happen. We took that style of talking about things that will happen. I told you which procedure we follow to speak of events that will happen. We use the assistance experienced people, who has got more knowledge than and we use our analysis. So, what we say often happens. We also should rejoice at that. It is true that nobody appreciates himself. Others appreciate him. But we also should appreciate that what we say happens. The problem is rather that the people to whom we talk understand too late. If what we said was not understood too late . . . You see, if all the things Kangura said wrote they had been seriously considered, we would have been happier. You cannot rejoice at being "a prophet of misfortunes." Yes, you cannot deny being one while it is the case. Still, you would be happier if what you say is understood, corrected, and taken seriously. So, let us take that point, even if it is a point that needs to be analyzed. In December, we look at RPF's tricks and we said: "RPF launched the war, saying that it wants to bring democracy in Rwanda." It found democracy already there. (Inaudible). When you talk about democracy, you mean the liberty of press, the springing up of political parties, the rights of individuals. Habyarimana had given us that. The Arusha agreements were set up. They said that Habyarimana will not sign upon them. Habyarimana went and signed them, you remember that he signed those agreements. They talked about setting up the transitional institutions. You know that the political parties existing when they signed for the transition, will be the ones to participate in the

government or in the Parliament. They signed that. After having been signed for, and it is that which became the cause of all this, the RPF . . . because RPF, for me, I know that it is a group of Tutsis, fighting to seize power by force. Every person has the right to consider it in the language he understands. A politician can have his way of explaining RPF. A journalist like you can have his way of explaining it. Still, for me, as I consider it, for I analyzed it more . . . Then, you know how they were invited for the swearing in ceremony. The president of the Republic would go there but they would not. Everything would be prepared and set up but the swearing in ceremony would not take place. We looked at that and we found out that there are many things behind. We looked at the complicity between the Prime Minister Agathe and Kavaruganda who was considered as an idol. You remember that then, they were saying that in case of the President of the Republic's unavailability, that Kavaruganda, the President of the Constitutional Court would be the one before whom they should be sworn in. You followed those events too . . . So, we saw that the game they wanted to set was for catching out the President of the Republic. However, it is not what RPF wanted. Even if the parties of the country's interior wanted to catch out the President of the Republic, it is not him that RPF wanted. RPF considered the President of the Republic as the King of Hutus, as the Hutus' shield, that in case of Habyarimana's death, no any other Hutu would rise up and shout. That is how RPF saw it, but RPF hid that from the parties of the interior. It just told the parties of the interior: "Just help us to fight against Habyarimana, he is the only obstacle." And the parties felt that they were going to fight against Habyarimana, to seize power from him. Seizing the power from Habyarimana was attacking him. But RPF said: "we have to seize power from him but he does not also have to remain alive. Because seizing power from the man named Habyarimana Juvénal and let him alive is useless for that power would still exist." It can happen that the presence of a person bothers all the people around. Then . . . After having seen that the swearing in ceremony failed three times, we started analyzing what was hid behind. We had two weeks during which the country was cold, both the opposition and the presidential trend keeping quiet. Nobody was talking. Knowing who was ruling the country was impossible. When we analyzed, we saw that there was a plan . . . We first sent our accomplices in UNAMIR, we put there our accomplices to follow the situation. We looked at the Belgians' preparations. We saw how the Belgians' opinion started to differ from Dallaire's because of their activities that were contrary to their assignment. We looked at RPF's preparations. You know that often we said that RPF sent Inyenzi every day. They would go to Murindi to bring cattle and they would bring back many Inyenzi here, in such a way that they had got any Inyenzi here. We considered that no leader spoke about that. Then, the President of the Republic was planning to go to Ivory Coast for that old man's funerals. We found that we were so unimportant people to tell the President of the Republic not to go to Ivory Coast. So, we wrote a document and we sent it to RTLM radio, we even sent a copy to Radio Rwanda and to the President of the Republic. I remember that it found him at his house. We were telling him that for the interests of the country, of the mass, he should not make that visit to Ivory Coast and send there somebody else. Because in that visit, what was planned? If the President of the Republic had gone in Ivory Coast, if he had left the soil of Rwanda and gone, that group whose leader was Twagiramungu should have met in UNAMIR building before Kavaruganda and would have got their deputies sworn in, they would have set up the transitional institutions. So, we who fight for the sovereignty of the Republic should have seen that as an extreme insolence and gone to fight against that group that appointed itself. After having fought against it, the war should be then launched. So, UNAMIR should have sided with those institutions

it set up itself, I can say that it set them up itself. After the launching of the war, the President of the Republic would come back in the country. So, he could have been shot at in those combats. They could fire at him because there is no any other place by which he should have passed but the airport and they could have fired at him there. That is how we saw it. So, we would have lost his life. If he did not come back, choosing to remain outside, they would say that he has fled and invented various stories on him, like that he fled from his country. They would have also accused him of being responsible of the troubles in the country. After having made that thing, we scattered it to many levels, we also gave it to bishops and priests, telling them: "Please, tell the President of the Republic about the situation." We have been enough fortunate for the President of the Republic . . . I would not say that he obeyed us, maybe it is also how he saw the situation, . . . and he did not go to Ivory Coast and sent the Speaker of the Assembly I think, the current President of the Republic, to represent him in that ceremony. We said: "We, from Kangura we are finally happy because we said something bad that was to happen and they knew it before and did not do it and peace came to Rwanda." Things went on . . . Then, we considered that silence I was telling you about, that cold thing that was in politics. We made some analysis and found that RPF will never accept to swear in because if it had done so . . . You see, at the time of the signature of Arusha agreements, parties were still encircled by the enemy. I can mention MDR, PL and PSD. They were still encircled by the enemy. Back from Arusha, scissions appeared within political parties, one part siding with Inkotanyi and another siding with Republic. The Inkotanyi considered the situation and said: "We fought for nothing. The strength we have in Arusha is different from the one we have now. That means that we will not be able to have any law passed in the cabinet or in the National Council for Development. So, there is no option. We cannot participate in institutions in which we will not have any influence." You know that Inkotanyi thought: "If we have enough influence in the National Council for Development, we will pass a vote in favour of a law to imprison all those who bother us, a law to pay the total debt we have asked from abroad to attack this Rwanda, all the laws that are in our favour." That is how they thought. Then, on seeing that they will never get all those things . . . Then, that is why I say that the white people's countries interfered a lot in that, some white people gave arms to RPF on credit. They said: "If RPF gets influence in the National Council for Development, it will pay us the debt it took. Still, if it loses that influence, that means that we would have lost because we will not ask anybody to come and pay us that money. While the Arusha agreements do not provide for that." You know that in Arusha agreements, there is nowhere they say that the money that the two belligerent parties used will come from here or there. It is not said anywhere. RPF thought that it would pay that money and give a present to Museveni who helped them using a law that they would pass in the National Council for Development. After finding out that it was impossible, RPF started those tricks of refusing the swearing in ceremony. Meanwhile, it was trying its best to kill the President of the Republic. We discovered that before and made analysis and found that there was nobody else whose death can be useful to RPF. Bucyana died, the party of the majority, people got scared and thought that the country was going to be destroyed. The leaders of the party . . . You know that I am one of the members of the CDR's executive committee - we held a meeting and felt that we had to tell our people to be careful for us not falling into the trap set by RPF. What was that trap? It was about those troubles. RPF wanted us to fall into those troubles, the combats to be reopened like those they have prepared when the President of the Republic was to go in Ivory Coast. We said that enough, on radio or television that our people should be calm. People actually obeyed

127 bis

10

us and were calm. You know that it is at that time Gatabazi had just died. Then, RPF said: "OK. Since Bucyana died and no troubles took place, Gatabazi died and there were no troubles, we can now also kill Habyarimana and then, the authorities in place will call for that meeting and we should put in place that government we wish to be set up." That is how were RPF's calculations. Mister Etienne, I would like to tell you that here there are three elements: RPF did not expect this current war. RPF also was surprised. It also did not know that the war will be like this. RPF thought that it would kill Habyarimana and after that, the transitional institutions should be immediately set up. They would have immediately asked to MRND : " We can do without Habyarimana, give us another member who can be the President of the Republic." You know that it was a powerless President of the Republic. They have deprived the whole power from him. That is how RPF thought, and their other accomplices thought so. They thought that after the death of the President of the Republic, there would be no more obstacles, that we, people of low rank will keep quiet and they would set up all the transition institutions. Then, we looked at all this and wrote that the President of the Republic might die at the end of March or at the beginning of April. Why did we put it at that time? We considered the different stages, you know that delegations came from abroad, that there were white people . . .

End of tape.

Certified that I have screened the tape AV/942 of 29/4/94 and made the translation into English of the important passage of the said tape to the best of my ability.



Signature

Date: 18/10/96