

PEACE, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE

Peace Psychology for the 21st Century



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CHAPTER 6

GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING: THEIR ROOTS AND PREVENTION

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The U.N. Genocide Convention, passed on December 9, 1948, has defined genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . ." In this chapter, I will explore the roots of and, briefly, some approaches to the prevention of genocide as well as mass killing, the killing of large numbers of people without the intention to destroy the whole group. Genocide and mass killing have fuzzy boundaries. Mass killing is frequently a waystation to genocide. Most importantly perhaps, genocide and mass killing have similar roots, and their prevention requires similar approaches. I will refer to them simply as group or collective violence.

The chapter will engage the central goals of peace psychology: understanding the roots of collective violence and its destructive consequences and exploring how such violence can be prevented and how individuals can contribute to its prevention and to the creation of peaceful societies and a peaceful world. I will discuss the following topics: (1) instigators of collective violence, such as difficult life conditions and group conflict; (2) psychological processes that arise from them, such as scapegoating and antagonistic ideologies; (3) the evolution of increasing violence that may end in geno-

cide; (4) characteristics of cultures that make these processes more or less probable; (5) group conflict as a source of collective violence; (6) the role of bystanders and the effects of their passivity; (7) the need for bystanders to intervene to halt violence once it has begun, together with useful modes of intervention; and finally, (8) proposals for preventing such violence before it begins.

THE ROOTS OF GROUP VIOLENCE

How do human beings develop the motivation to kill large numbers of people or even to exterminate a whole group? How do the inhibitions that normally stop us from killing other people decline? Understanding the roots of genocide and mass killing requires us to look at social conditions, culture, political systems, relationships between groups, individual and group psychology, and the behavior of "bystanders."

Difficult Life Conditions as a Source of Group Violence

Intense life problems in a society, as a starting point for group violence, include severe economic problems, great political conflict, rapid and substantial social change and their combinations. For example, Germany

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faces tremendous life problems before Hitler came to power. In Rwanda, a very poor, overpopulated country, preceding the genocide of the Tutsis and the massacres of "moderate" Hutus in 1994, there was further increase in population, great increase in economic problems, a civil war, and political conflict among the Hutus who ruled the country (Kressel, 1996; Prunier, 1995; Smith, 1998).

Difficult life conditions create social upheaval and frustrate fundamental human needs (Kelman, 1990). Especially important are the following needs: for physical and material security, including the belief that one will be able to feed oneself and one's family; for defense of one's identity or self-concept, including one's values and ways of life; for a feeling of effectiveness and control over important events that affect oneself; for a comprehension of reality, especially as social disorganization and change make people's world views ineffective in understanding the world and their place in it; for connection to and support by other people, especially in difficult times when connection is disrupted by people focusing on their own needs (Staub, 1996b).

Psychological Responses

In response to difficult life conditions, people often scapegoat a particular group, blaming the group for life problems (Allport, 1954; Staub, 1989). They adopt new *ideologies*, conceptions or visions of how to organize society or the world. People need positive visions, especially in difficult times, but the ideologies they adopt are often *destructive*, in that they identify "enemies" who supposedly stand in the way of the ideology's fulfillment. Many authors suggest that scapegoating and destructive ideologies are created by leaders in an effort to gain followers or solidify their influence over followers.

Another theory, however, is that when people cannot find ways to fulfill their basic needs constructively, they act to fulfill them in destructive ways, such as turning to and even seeking leaders who initiate or encourage scapegoating and offer destructive ideologies.

By scapegoating others, people come to feel better about themselves and their group: The difficulties they face are not their fault. By adopting destructive ideologies, they adopt a new understanding of what reality is and should be. The Nazi ideology told Germans that while others, especially Jews, are inferior, they themselves are superior people and have a right to more "living space," to the territories of other people. The ideology of Cambodia's communists, the Khmer Rouge, proclaimed *total social equality*, identifying those who previously had power and educated people in general as enemies unable to contribute to an equal society. Thus, some must be destroyed to create a better world for "all." Both scapegoating and ideology strengthen identity and connect people to others who join them in working for a shared cause against a targeted group. Both create hope.

The Evolution of Destructiveness

Genocide does not directly result from turning against others. Its motivation and psychological possibility evolve gradually. In most instances, there is a progression of actions and a psychological evolution along a continuum of destruction. Sometimes the evolution starts long before those who commit genocide appear on the scene. For example, long before the genocide in Turkey in 1915 to 1916, the Armenians were discriminated against as a subject people and suffered repeated attacks. In one period during the late nineteenth century, at least

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200,000 Armenians were killed (Hartunian, 1968; Kuper, 1981).

Both research with individuals (Buss, 1966; Goldstein et al., 1975) and my analysis of group violence (Staub, 1989) indicate that people learn by doing. Engaging in harmful acts changes individual perpetrators, bystanders, societal norms and institutions, and the entire culture. Such changes not only make possible but also often encourage increasingly harmful acts. *Just world thinking* (Lerner, 1980), the tendency to believe that the world is a just place, makes perpetrators and bystanders see the suffering of victims as deserved, either because of their actions, or their character, or both. Victims are further devalued and ultimately excluded from the realm of moral values and rules (Opatow, 1990; Staub, 1990). Ordinary moral and human consideration no longer applies to them. This enables perpetrators to engage in greater and greater violence. Some develop a fanatic commitment to fulfill the ideology and eliminate its enemy. Many German Nazis developed this fanaticism and continued to kill Jews long after it was evident that Germany was going to lose the war.

Cultural/Societal Characteristics

A number of cultural/societal characteristics predispose a group to respond to difficult life conditions by thoughts and actions that lead to violence. Most societies possess these characteristics to some degree; they become dangerous, however, when they are present in combination and to a substantial degree.

Differentiating between "us" and "them," and devaluing "them," are essential, central roots of people turning against others. Such devaluation often becomes part of a culture and societal institutions. *Cultural devaluation* evolves because it serves a number of functions, like strengthening identity by elevating one's group over another or justifying the

lesser status or rights of some group. There was a history of devaluation of Jews by Germans; of Tutsis by Hutus; and of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims by one another. There was a rift, suspicion and antagonism in Cambodia between the ruling classes and wealthier people living in the cities and the peasants working the land in the countryside. (See Niens and Cairns in this volume for a review of the social identity theory explanation of causes of devaluation of others.)

A monolithic society, in contrast to a pluralistic society, is another important predisposing characteristic. In a monolithic society, the range of values and beliefs and the freedom to express them are limited—either by the political system or by the nature of the culture. In such a society, it is less likely that members of the population will speak out against policies and practices that inflict harm on some group. In a pluralistic society, by contrast, many voices intermingle in the public domain. The public dialogue makes scapegoating, the widespread adoption of destructive ideologies, and progression along a continuum of destruction less likely.

A strong respect for and *obedience to authority* is another predisposing cultural characteristic. For example, long before Hitler came to power Germans were regarded as extremely respectful of and obedient to authority (Girard, 1980). In societies that are strongly oriented to authority, people will be more affected by difficult life conditions, as their leaders and society fail to protect them. They will also be less likely to speak out as leaders move the society along the continuum of destruction.

The nature of the political system is also important. Extensive analysis of democratic and authoritarian/totalitarian systems shows that democracies seldom engage in genocide or start wars against other democracies (Rummel, 1994). Democracy, however, can range from being superficial to

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deeply rooted in culture and social institu-
tions. Germany was a democracy during the
Weimar Republic, but it became a totalitar-
ian system under the Nazis. In Argentina,
military dictatorships regularly replaced
elected governments. The institutions of a
“civic society,” moderate respect for author-
ity, and the right and opportunity for all
groups to participate in public life are im-
portant aspects of a pluralistic, democratic
society.

Finally, *unhealed group trauma* can be a
source of collective violence. Trauma cre-
ates insecurity and mistrust (Agger, this vol-
ume; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Members of vic-
timized groups will see the world as a
dangerous place. During periods of conflict,
they will tend to focus on their own vulnera-
bility and needs, making it difficult for them
to consider the needs of others. Individuals
and groups that have experienced great suf-
fering, especially violence at the hand of
others, are more likely to respond to a re-
newed threat with violence, which they will
view as defensive aggression.

However, it is far from inevitable that
survivors of group violence will become per-
petrators. Many individual survivors devote
themselves to the service of other human
beings (Valent, 1998). Most likely, these are
people who have experienced genuine
human connections to others or have had
protective or healing experiences and want
to make sure that others won't suffer as they
have.

GROUP CONFLICT AS THE SOURCE OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Histories of Ethnic and Group Conflict: Ideologies of Antagonism

The evolution of destructiveness may take
the form of mutual antagonism and vio-
lence over an extended period. With the

psychological groundwork already laid, a
sudden flare-up of violence can take place.
A history of conflict, hostility, and mutual vi-
olence leads to perceiving the “other” as an
enemy who represents a danger to one's ex-
istence. At the same time, each group's
identity is partly defined by its enmity to the
other. I call this an *ideology of antagonism*
(Staub, 1989). Examples of ideologies of an-
tagonism include the French and Germans
during some of their history and the parties
in the former Yugoslavia at the end of
World War II, as well as the relationship be-
tween Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda (Kressel,
1996; Prunier, 1995).

Conflicts over Status, Power, and Rights

Difficult life conditions can lead subordi-
nate groups in a society to demand greater
rights and opportunities. Protest can turn
into revolt. If successful, it can turn into
mass killings or genocide *against* the domi-
nant group, as happened in Cambodia.
More often, though, demands, acts of self-
assertion, and violence by the subordinate
group lead to increasing persecution, mass
killings, or genocide *by* the dominant
group. State response to rebellion by “eth-
noclasses” excluded from power has been
the most frequent cause of genocide (Fein,
1993) and other group violence since the
Second World War.

The disappearances in Argentina
(*Nunca Más*, 1986) as well as in a number of
other South and Central American coun-
tries are examples of mass violence emanat-
ing from the dominant group. In Colombia,
guerillas rule segments of the country and
kidnap people for ransom, a practice that
has spread so that about 50 percent of all
kidnappings in the world now take place in
Colombia. In response, paramilitary groups
and the military itself have killed many peo-
ple (Human Rights Watch, 1996; U.S. State

Department, 1996), including peasants suspected of supporting the guerillas and members of political parties and organizations identified as leftist, especially their leaders.

Violence perpetrated against those who try to change the social system is frequently not just a matter of defending self-interest. It is also the defense of "hierarchy legitimizing myths" (Sidanius, in press), or what may be called "ideologies of superiority" by those who possess power, wealth, and influence, and come to see societal arrangements as "right" (Staub, 1989).

The Role of Leaders and Elites

The combination of difficult life conditions (or other instigators) and culture affects the kind of leaders a population is open to. Although leaders have some latitude in how they deal with difficult life conditions or group conflict, they often intensify already existing hostility (Kressel, 1996). They not only do this to gain and strengthen influence, but also because they themselves are affected by the combination of culture and difficult life conditions. Leaders often magnify differences between groups in power and status, adopt or create destructive ideologies, and use propaganda to enhance devaluation of and fear of the other. They create organizations that are potential instruments of violence—for example, paramilitary organizations, which have been used as tools of collective violence in many countries, including Bosnia and Rwanda (Kressel, 1996), Argentina (Nunca Mas, 1986), Turkey, and Germany.

Some leaders have been especially important in creating great violence: Hitler, Stalin, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, probably Milosevich in Yugoslavia, and warlords in Africa, like General Aidid in Somalia (Farer, 1996) are among well-known names. The

combinations of societal conditions and cultures discussed above may allow individuals who would not be accepted under "normal" conditions, to come to the fore. However, at least some of these leaders are not initially motivated to bring about the destruction and violence they create. But the personality of the leaders, the culture of the group, the ideology that is created or adopted and resulting actions, lead to an evolution that produces unfortunate changes in both the group and the leaders themselves.

The Passivity and Complicity of Bystanders

Both internal bystanders (members of a perpetrator group who are themselves not perpetrators) and external bystanders (outside groups and nations) have great potential to influence events and inhibit progression along the continuum of destruction. Their active opposition can reawaken the perpetrators' moral values, challenge the exclusion of victims from the moral universe, cause concern about retaliation or punishment, and make harm-doing costly. Unfortunately, internal bystanders normally remain passive and, over time, many of them come to support the perpetrators. External bystanders usually also remain passive, proceed with business as usual, or actively support the perpetrators. For example, in 1936 the world affirmed Nazi Germany by holding the Olympics in Berlin, and U.S. corporations continued doing business in Germany (Simpson, 1993). When the killings of Armenians began in 1915, Germany, Turkey's ally in the war, remained passive (Dadrian, 1996). Articles in German newspapers even justified Turkish actions (Bedrossyan, 1983). More recently, while Iraq was using chemical weapons against its Kurdish citizens, many countries, including the United States, continued to provide military

equipment. United States provided military aid to Rwanda. It is difficult to do so without killing civilians when the victims, in 1994,

Perpetrators' passivity and complicity of bystanders is a significant factor in their support of violence. This is evident in the great potential for other by-standers. How a bystander takes a lead role in distressing Chambo's heroic actions during World War II is some of the help that

The states, are exerting influence. But with painful, tend to be guilty by association. This may be less likely

THE POTENTIAL OF BYSTANDERS TO HALT

The Issue

The further the continuum of violence is permitted to proceed, the more difficult it is to stop. B

equipment and economic aid to it. The United States saw Iraq as a counterweight to a fundamentalist, hostile Iran. France provided military support to the government of Rwanda in the early 1990s and continued to do so without objecting to the sporadic killing of thousands of Tutsis before 1994, when the genocide was perpetrated (Gourevich, 1998).

Perpetrators are confirmed in the rightness of their cause by the passivity of bystanders (Taylor, 1983), and even more by their support. By the same token, substantial evidence shows that individuals have great potential influence on the behavior of other bystanders, and even on perpetrators. How a person acts—remaining passive or taking action—and what a person says can lead others to help or not help someone in distress (Latane & Darley, 1970). At Le Chambon, the Huguenot village in France, heroic actions by the villagers during World War II in saving Jewish refugees changed some of the perpetrators, who in turn helped the villagers (Hallie, 1979).

The potential of groups of people, states, and the international community to exert influence is great, though rarely used. But witnessing the suffering of others is painful, and bystanders who remain passive tend to reduce their empathic suffering and guilt by distancing themselves from victims. This may make later action by them even less likely.

THE POTENTIAL OF BYSTANDERS: BYSTANDER ACTIONS TO HALT VIOLENCE

The Issue of Intervention

The further a group has progressed along a continuum of destruction, the more committed perpetrators become to their violent course. Bystanders must exert influence if

the evolution toward mass killing or genocide is to stop. Many types of bystanders can play important roles—for example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizen groups (Rupesinghe, 1996). Beyond a certain point in the evolution of violence, however, the influence and power of nations and the community of nations is required. The earlier that nations respond to human rights violations, the less committed will perpetrators be and more likely it is that they can be stopped without the use of force.

Even in cases where intervention is clearly justified, or even demanded by current international law, it has rarely occurred. Nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states is a longstanding tradition, dating at least from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention have become part of the U.N. charter, and they greatly limit the potential of the United Nations to respond to human rights violations.

For nations and the community of nations to become active bystanders, it is necessary that the pursuit of national interest, national obligation, and nationhood itself be defined to include the protection of human rights and the safety of human beings. This would require a moral vision about shared responsibility for the protection of human rights and the development of *standards* for *when* nations should act, *who* should act, and *what* actions should be taken. The existing system mandates action only in the most extreme situation, genocide, and even this mandate is not followed. The United Nations pulled its peacekeepers out of Rwanda when the violence began. As it became evident that a genocide was in progress in Rwanda, attempts to send back peacekeepers were slowed by a refusal to invoke the U.N. Genocide Convention and by a lack of cooperation among nations, partic-

ularly the United States (Gourevich, 1998). Effective response requires the creation of *institutions* to provide early warning and, even more importantly, to *activate* responses. The creation of standards and institutions would contribute to a responsible international system in which effective action could be implemented.

The Types of Actions Required

Early warning is extremely important. A conceptual system like the one described here can indicate the need for action, based on the assessment of life conditions, group conflict, movement along the continuum of destruction, and cultural characteristics. Others have also proposed ways to determine the need for action, focusing not only on existing levels of discrimination and violence but changes in them (Bond & Vogele, 1995; Charny, 1991; Harff & Gurr, 1990).

However, in the past, early warning often has not led to action. Human Rights Watch publicized the impending danger of violence in Rwanda and the head of the U.N. peacekeeping force received information about the impending plans for genocide, but no action occurred.

The United Nations needs to act more *before* a genocide occurs. At this time, the United Nations has to rely on nations for military force, for sanctions, and even for powerful condemnation. Since the passivity of nations is a central issue, there ought to be institutions or offices within nations working with the United Nations that have the responsibility to initiate action in response to danger signs. The process of developing procedures and institutions can itself contribute to changing the international climate, to values, commitments, and operating procedures related to the rights and well-being of people everywhere.

If reactions occur early enough, they may start with high-level *private communication*. Such communication enables leaders to change a violent course without losing face. *Public demands* can cause leaders who do not want to appear weak in front of their followers to resist policy changes. Nations and the community of nations, speaking with a firm and unified voice when persecution and violence begin, can reaffirm—and to some degree reinstate in the eyes of perpetrators—the humanity of the victims. Intervening groups can raise concern among perpetrators about their own image in the eyes of the world, and about possible consequences of their actions, which could move some internal bystanders to action.

In times of crisis, the leaders of the international community should get directly involved. The course of action in the former Yugoslavia might have been different if, for example, critical foreign ministers had traveled to Zagreb and Belgrade immediately after the Serbs attacked Croatia and bombed the ancient city of Dubrovnik. They could have offered help with mediation, with negotiations in resolving issues, as well as economic and other types of assistance. At the same time, such a delegation could have firmly and forcefully communicated a resolve not to tolerate further violence, specifying actions they would take if it continued.

If words and warnings are ineffective, nations can intensify their response by withholding aid and can progress, if necessary, to sanctions and boycotts. The earlier such actions are taken, and the more uniformly nations abide by them, the more effective will they be. The participation of many nations helped make the boycott of South Africa effective. Sanctions that pressure leaders directly, for example, by freezing their assets in foreign banks, can be especially useful. More problematic are long-

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term sanctions that deprive a population of the essentials of everyday life, like food and medication, as in the case of Iraq and Cuba.

When violence is already at a high level, the time for sanctions as the only response will have passed. When no other means exist to save human lives, using an international force can become unavoidable. By the time force was used in Bosnia, it seemed the only option available to bring a halt to violence.

Preventing Collective Violence

Even when there is no imminent danger of intense violence, instigating conditions and culture may make future collective violence probable. In such instances, prevention is extremely important. The role of outsiders, of bystanders, of "third parties" is crucial here as well (Staub, 1996c).

A number of organizations, like Peaceworkers and Peace Brigade International, send foreign volunteers into countries where the government or the military appears ready to perpetrate violence against some group. Usually, perpetrators do not want the world to know about their violence and do not want other countries involved. As a result, the simple presence of foreign witnesses can sometimes stop violence at demonstrations or against individuals whom the perpetrators consider undesirable. For example, in the fall of 1997, a coalition between Peaceworkers and a new youth-led human rights organization, Global Youthconnect, sent American college students to be present at student demonstrations in Kosovo. No violence occurred at these demonstrations.

Healing and Reconciliation

Helping previously victimized groups heal is essential to preventing later violence by them. Acknowledgement of the group's suf-

fering and expressions of empathy from outsiders promote healing. So does people writing about and talking about what has happened to them, their family and their group, and providing support to each other (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker et al., 1987). Writing and talking about painful experiences, in small groups, in a context of mutual empathy and support can help replace the turning inward and disconnection that come from victimization with connections to other people (Staub & Pearlman, 1996).

Testimonials, memorials, and ceremonies commemorating victimization and suffering can also promote healing. However, many groups memorialize their suffering in ways that recreate injury and fuel nationalism. For example, Serbs have focussed on the tremendous injury they suffered in the defeat of Serb forces by Turks in the fourteenth century. The sense of injury is understandable in that Turkey subsequently ruled Serbia for centuries. But the continued focus on deep national wounds has been a source both of hostility to Serbs who in earlier centuries converted to Islam and of destructive nationalism. It is important, instead, to create ceremonies that help people grieve and at the same time form connections with others in building a better, peaceful future.

Frequently, members of the perpetrator group feel wounded, either because they had been previously victimized, or because the violence has been mutual. They may also be wounded because killing and making people suffer are actions that wound (Browning, 1992; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), as does belonging to a group that has done that. Both groups may need to heal, assume responsibility for their actions, and reconcile. This is extremely difficult soon after intense group violence. It is easier if at least important perpetrators are punished.

In places like Rwanda and Bosnia, the way groups are geographically intertwined makes reconciliation essential for avoiding continued cycles of violence. See Agger (this volume) for a further discussion of trauma reduction in Bosnia.

Dialogue, Problem-solving Workshops, and Other Contact

Dialogue between members of hostile groups can help them heal and reconcile if it addresses past wounds and fosters mutual empathy. It can help them find solutions to practical problems the groups have to resolve in order to live with each other. Researchers and practitioners of conflict resolution have found that bringing members of hostile groups together who are ready to talk to each other can lead to mutual acceptance and commitment to improve group relations (Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 1990; Rothman, 1992).

Creating contact is a significant achievement by itself. Deep engagement with the "other," ideally under supporting conditions like equality, is important to overcome negative stereotypes and hostility (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1997). Identifying joint goals and shared effort in their behalf are extremely valuable. People can join to rebuild houses destroyed in the course of violence, as some have done in Bosnia. They can join to help children who lost parents or have been traumatized by the violence around them. Healing and reconciliation can facilitate such contact, while positive contact itself contributes to healing, resilience (Butler, 1997), and reconciliation. See Murphy, as well as Niens and Cairns (both in this volume), for further discussion of how contact can be constructive in helping perpetrators and previously victimized people engage in efforts to prevent further violence.

Truth Commissions and Tribunals

Truth commissions and tribunals, by establishing what has actually happened, make it less likely that perpetrators will be able to consider themselves victims, which otherwise might lead to renewed violence by them. A significant contribution of the Nuremberg tribunals to the creation of German democracy was to show the German people the horrendous actions of their own nation, extensively using materials gathered by the Nazis themselves.

Truth commissions and tribunals, by acknowledging victims' suffering, can promote healing. Affirming that the violence against them was neither normal nor acceptable can help victims feel safer. The punishment of perpetrators, especially of leaders, communicates to the world and to the formerly victimized group that violence against groups is not acceptable.

The best way for truth commissions to operate to achieve these positive ends, and the right relationship between establishing the truth and assigning punishment, are still in the process of evolution. The latest and best-known example of a truth commission, in South Africa, was effective in enabling some people to tell their stories and to make the actions of perpetrators public knowledge. However, some of the people who were victimized during the apartheid regime have felt deeply hurt that many perpetrators who confessed what they had done seemingly without regret or apology could get amnesty (Hamber, 1998). This is a complicated matter as well: whom to punish and for what crimes for the sake of justice and healing, without punishing so many people that it creates new wounds that may interfere with reconciliation. Truth and reconciliation processes established in South Africa at the end of *apartheid* are discussed in detail in this volume by de la Rey.

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Culture Change: Democratization

By changing aspects of cultures, the likelihood of genocide and mass killing may be reduced. But groups do not welcome others' attempts to interfere with their culture. Helping countries with democratization has been one of the few acceptable ways to create culture change. For example, after the fall of communism, Eastern European countries welcomed Western help in developing the institutions that maintain democracy: a well-functioning, fair judiciary, free and fair voting practices, party politics, and the creation and strengthening of nongovernmental organizations (Sampson, 1996). Democratic institutions and practices, in turn, promote pluralism and reduce overly strong respect for and obedience to authority.

Children: Inclusive Caring and Moral Courage

While institutions have a life of their own, it is individuals who maintain both culture and institutions. Raising children with humane values who care about the welfare of human beings is an essential avenue to prevention. However, such caring has to be inclusive, has to extend to people outside the group, in order to make genocide less likely and active responses to the persecution of people outside the group more likely. Children also need to develop moral courage, the ability to stand up for their values. Essential are warmth and affection, positive guidance by parents and other socializers, and encouragement of children to actually help other people, so that they learn by doing (Eisenberg, 1992; Staub, 1996a).

Other chapters in this volume discuss in detail programs concerned with the care and education of children. Hakvoort and Haglund consider children and peacebuilding, and Coleman and Deutsch describe

school programs designed to promote education for a peaceful world.

Prospects for the Twenty-first Century

The twentieth century saw many genocides and mass killings. Will these horrors continue into the twenty-first century? Unfortunately, without a system of prevention, this is likely to be the case. We live amidst tremendous changes in the world, for example, in technology, modes of communication, the nature of jobs and the globalization of the world economy and culture. Because of these changes and the spread of belief in individual rights, including the rights of women, there will be changes in social roles, family life, and parenting in traditional societies.

As I have noted in discussing difficult life conditions, great social change puts great demands on people. This is even true of positive change. But some of the changes that are likely to occur, and the reactions they evoke in traditional societies, will not be positive. In addition, the discrepancy between rich and poor has been increasing, adding to the potential for violence. Global communication that makes poor people aware of others' wealth is likely to intensify their sense of injustice.

These conditions are likely to frustrate basic needs to a substantial degree. They are likely to intensify a trend that has been already evident in our century; namely, individuals turning to some group, often an ethnic, religious, or national group, or an ideological movement that is capable of fulfilling their needs for security, identity, and connection.

To make genocide and mass killing unlikely, prevention becomes essential. The United Nations' focus on economic development and the improvement in quality of

life as a central avenue to prevention, while important, may not be fast enough or, by itself, sufficient.

The U.N. General Assembly has identified eight principles essential to the promotion of a culture of peace: non-violence, respect for human rights, democracy, tolerance, promotion of development, education for peace, free flow of information, and wider participation of women. While some of these are processes and actions that need to be created, others are outcomes, or end products. To bring them about requires some of the preventive efforts I have suggested (and others that are discussed in the section of this book on peacebuilding). It requires positive visions about the future

and the creation of communities that provide people with identity and connection, not separation or opposition. These may best be smaller communities rather than larger, potentially violent ones. To create positive visions in difficult times requires support and help to leaders by "bystanders" of many kinds. Concentrated efforts by the community of nations, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations are all needed. But individual citizens must exert influence on all these systems and must, on their own or as members of nongovernmental organizations, directly engage in preventive efforts if genocide and mass killings, which have devastated the twentieth century, are to end.

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